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Father of an Illegitimate Child
His Right To Be Heard
The right of an out-of-wedlock father to participate in
the disposition of his illegitimate child is uncertain under
present case law and statutes. This Note examines the
effect on the parties involved in the adoption process
when the father is allowed to be heard. The author pro-
poses legislative modifications which define and assure
the out-of-wedlock father's rights.
INTRODUCTION
The natural father of an illegitimate child has been the for-
gotten figure in the illegitimacy triangle. Much attention has been
directed to the mother and her rights to custody of the child. Ma-
ternal consent has long been required for the child's adoption. The
illegitimate child has been favored by the courts,2 legislatures'
and legal commentators. 4 The natural father, however, commonly
called the "putative father" or "out-of-wedlock father," has been
subjected to increasing obligations without acquiring correspond-
ing rights.
One of the unsettled problems in the area of illegitimacy is
whether an out-of-wedlock father should have a legal interest in
the disposition of his child subsequent to relinquishment by the
natural mother. He may wish to seek custody himself or to sug-
gest another plan of custody or adoption. Traditionally, the fa-
ther's influence over the custody of his child has been limited to
a habeas corpus proceeding brought after the child has been
placed in an adoptive home.5 Since courts are extremely reluctant
I. E.g., In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954);
Marshall v. Reams, 82 Fla. 499, 14 So. 95 (1898); People ex rel. Buell v. Bell,
20 Ill. App. 2d 82, 155 N.E2d 104 (1959); In re Ashton, 374 Pa. 185, 97 A.2d
368 (1953); CAL. Civ. CODE § 200, 224; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (Supp.
1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 2 (1963).
2. See, e.g., In re Shady, 264 Minn. 292, 118 N.W.2d 449 (1962); People
ex rel. Gibson v. Starbuck, 42 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Ex parte Combs,
77 Ohio L. Abs. 458, 150 N-..2d 505 (C.P. 1958).
3. CAL. Civ. CODE § 196(a); MnwN. STAT. § 259.28 (1961).
4. BucK, CHiLDREN FOR ADOPTiON (1964); Doss, It You ADOPT A CHnz
(1957); YouNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK (1954); 26 ALBANY I,. REv. 335 (1962); 26
BROOKLYN L. REv. 45 (1959); Comment, 59 YALEL.J. 715 (1950).
5. Aycock v. Hampton, 84 Miss. 2904, 36 So. 245 (1904); Fierro v. Ljubicich,
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to remove a child from a prospective adoptive home to which
the child has become accustomed," the habeas corpus remedy is
often undesirable, from the father's point of view.
This Note will attempt to determine the extent to which the
out-of-wedlock father should be heard in the disposition of his
child. The examination will focus on the two methods by which
the natural mother may relinquish her child for adoption -the
parental termination proceeding or the mother's voluntary sur-
render.7 The interests to be considered include those of the child,
the natural mother, the adoption agencies and adoptive parents,
and the out-of-wedlock father. Finally, proposals which adequate-
ly protect all interests will be suggested.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE OUT-OF-WEDLOCK
FATHER'S INTERESTS
At common law an illegitimate child was filius nullius, the son
of no one." Initially, most states adopted the position that the out-
of-wedlock father had no connection to his illegitimate child other
than a moral obligation toward the child or mother.9 The common
law placed the onus of the parents' immoral act on the child in
5 Misc. 2d. 202, 165 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Templeton v. Walker, 179
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Wade v. State, 39 Wash. 2d 744, 238 P.2d
914 (1951); Hayes v. Strauss, 151 Va. 186, 144 S.E. 482 (1928).
6. When a child has been with prospective adoptive parents for between
one and twelve months, the courts feel it would not be in the best interests of
the child to remove him. Consequently when the adoptive parents are peti-
tioning the court for a final adoptive decree, it is generally too late for the
father to assert an interest effectively. E.g., Day v. Hatton, 210 Ga. 749, 83
S.E.2d 6 (1954); In re Zink, 269 Minn. 585, 182 N.W.2d 795 (1964); In re
Schwartzkopf, 149 Neb. 460, 81 N.W.2d 294 (1948); Ex parte Wallace, 26
N.M. 181, 190 Pac. 1020 (1920).
7. Some states require judicial or administrative review of all adoptions, in-
eluding independent placements. E.g., MICH. Corp. LAws § 710.1-.12 (1948);
MIr N. STAT. 9§ 257.0-.175 (1961); Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.030 (1959); OHxo REy.
CODE Au. § 3107.05, .08 (Page 1960). Independent placements in other states
are many times free of any judicial or administrative control. For a discussion
of the various state practices see Comment, 59 YALE L.. 715 (1950).
Independent placements not subject to judicial control have been excluded
from the scope of this Note.
8. I BLACKSTONE, COM3M;NTARES 454-60 (7th ed. 1775); 16 CoLUmr. L.
REv. 698 (1916).
9. E.g., Cichy v. Kostyk, 19 Conn. Supp. 368, 114 A.2d 221 (C.P. 1955);
State v. McCurdy, 116 Me. 859, 102 Atl. 72 (1917); Yearteau v. Bacon's




the hope that the possibility of producing stigmatized issue would
discourage the act.'0
Eventually, the states retreated from the complete common
law separation of the out-of-wedlock father and his child by estab-
lishing statutory relationships between them. For example, in
Minnesota the father is now required to pay child support,11
medical expenses of the mother,2 maintenance expenses of the
mother prior to and after confinement, 3 and expenses incurred if
the child is stillborn or dies after birth.14 Several states allow the
illegitimate child to inherit to a limited extent from the natural
father.' 5 Two states allow equal participation in the natural fa-
ther's estate.:' The purpose of these statutes is to provide financial
security for the child and mother rather than to establish a formal
family relationship.17
The courts have also recognized that the father has some
protectible interest in the child. Generally it is said that in habeas
corpus proceedings' subsequent to the mother's death, the out-of-
wedlock father has a strong right to custody of the child. 9 The
underlying premise of the courts in granting custody to the father
appears to be an expectation that the father taking the child into
his home will legitimate him. Thus, the law's strong preference
10. See in re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 159 P.2d 643, 648 (1945),
where the Court noted that in some jurisdictions the illegitimate child was
denied any right of support, recognition, or inheritance from the father. See
generally Embick, The Illegitimate Father, 3 J. F4A. L. 321 (1963).
11. M mn. STAT. § 257.23 (1961).
12. Ibid.
13. Id. at § 257.24 (1961).
14. Ibid. Accord, FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-60-
7 (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.87 (Supp. 1966).
15. E.g., MiN. STAT. AN. § 525.172 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. §
74-4-10 (1953). See 6 POWELL, REAL PRoPERTY § 1008, at 657 (1965); 26
BRooELm L. REv. 45 (1959).
16. Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206(A) (1956); Oa. REv. STAT. §§ 109.060,
111.231 (1965).
17. Coan v. State, 224 Ala. 584, 141 So. 263 (1932); Commonwealth ex rel.
Powell v. Ross, 277 Ky. 212, 126 S.W.2d 150 (1939); Emmons v. Common-
wealth, 197 Ky. 674, 247 S.W. 956 (1928); State ex rel. Gill v. Volz, 156 Ohio
St. 60, 45 Ohio Op. 68, 100 N.E.2d 203 (Supp. Ct. 1951); Beattie v. Traynor,
114 Vt. 238, 42 A.2d 485 (1945).
18. The writ is a judicial decree releasing persons who are being detained
from the control of those who are not entitled to their custody. State ex rel.
Aucoin v. Aucoin, 174 La. 7, 139 So. 645 (1982); People ex rel. Oprandy v.
Ciarccia, 49 App. Div. 90, 63 N.Y.S. 497 (1900).
19. E.g., In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954);
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for legitimation over bastardy will be served.20 This preference has
also been served in at least one state by a statute which provides
that the child is automatically legitimated when placed with the
father.21 Of course, legitimation will not take place if the child re-
mains with the mother or is raised in a foster home. An illegiti-
mate child living with a natural parent will be relieved of possible
social embarrassment caused by reluctance or inability to speak
of his natural parents. Some recognition has been given to the
intangible natural bond between blood relatives as justifying
custody in the out-of-wedlock father.Y The same arguments have
been used when the out-of-wedlock father has sought visitation
privileges while his child is in the mother's custody. 3 Courts have
Commonwealth ex rel. Harper v. Fuller, 142 Pa. Super. 98, 15 A.2d 518 (1940);
State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wash. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945).
Although the out-of-wedlock father generally. has the right to custody of
his illegitimate child upon the mother's death, the rule is not inflexible. When
the contest is with a relative, the out-of-wedlock father usually prevails. See
In re Richardet, 280 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5
Misc. 2d 202, 165 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Supp. Ct. 1957). When the illegitimate child
is with a child placement agency, the cases are divided as to whether the out-
of-wedlock father or the agency gains custody. In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222,
118 N.W.2d 449 (1962) (welfare department not allowed to take custody after
mother placed child with father); People exr el. Gibson v. Starbuck, 42 N.Y.S.2d
820 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (father deemed too old at 75); French v. Catholic Com-
munity League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E.2d 113 (1942) (welfare department
received custody from mother but father prevailed); Wade v. State, 39 Wash.
2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951) (father had right to custody after mother
abandoned child). When the illegitimate child is already in the home of adop-
tive parents, the out-of-wedlock father generally cannot gain custody of his
child. See Day v. Hatton, 210 Ga. 749, 88 SXE.2d 6 (1954); In re Schwartzkopf,
149 Neb. 460, 31 N.W.2-d 294 (1948); Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190 Pac.
1020 (1920).
20. In re Guardianship of Smith, supra note 19; Garner v. B. F. Goodrich
Rubber Co., 64 Ohio App. 300, 28 N.E.2d 652 (1938); Wydra v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 153 Pa. Super. 529, 34 A.2d 326 (1943).
21. See CAL. Civ. COD, § 230; In re Guardianship of Smith, supra note 19;
cf. ORE. REv. STAT. § 109.060, 111.231 (1965).
22. Garrett v. Mahaley, 199 Ala. 606, 75 So. 10 (1917); Allison v. Bryan,
91 Okla. 557, 97 Pac. 282 (1908); Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302, 82 Am.
Dec. 726 (Pa. 1838). The premise is that natural parents have a fundamental
right under natural law to establish a home and bring up children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262, U.S. 890 (1923). See
also People ex rel. Porthnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 NE.2d 895 (1952).
23. Courts generally apply the standard principle of best interest of the
child when visitation privileges are in issue. See, e.g., Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 336, 205 P.24 48 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Baker v. Baker, 81 NJEq.
135, 85 Atl. 816 (Ch. 1913); People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova", 14 App.
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been willing to grant such privileges 24 since association with the
father may confer unique benefits upon the child25 Of course,
every request made by an out-of-wedlock father is evaluated un-
der the particular facts involved. It is clear, however, that present
law does not demand that the natural father's interests be totally
disregarded.2 6
II. OUT-OF-WEDLOCK FATHER'S OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD SUBSEQUENT TO RELINQUISHMENT
OF CHLD BY MOTHER
When the mother, voluntarily or involuntarily, relinquishes
the child for adoption, the father's opportunity to participate in
the child's subsequent disposition is controlled by the state child
welfare statutes.ar Several states allow the out-of-wedlock father
to be heard in proceedings relating to custody and adoption 8
Conversely, a few states specifically exclude the father from such
Div. 2d 317, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961); In re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172
N.Y.S.d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1958). See generally 26 ALBANY L. REv. 335 (1962).
See note 2 .zpra.
24. See, e.g., People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova", .supra note 23; In re
Anonymous, aupra note 28; Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 213 A.2d 155 (Sup.
Ct. Pa. 1965). See generally 26 ALBAN L. REv. 835 (1962); 39 TLnmE L.Q.
222 (1966).
25. One court has said that the father's presence was "a constant encour-
agement, his example an ever present model, and a boy, circumstanced as this
one is, by becoming a member of his father's household will meet more nearly
on an equality with others the problems of life than did he remain with his
mother." Allison v. Bryan, 21 Okla. 557, 573, 97 Pac. 282, 288 (1908). See
People ez rel. Mahoff v. Matsoui, 139 Misc. 21, 247 N.Y.S. 112 (Sup. Ct.
1931).
Visitation privileges have been denied, however, when the presence of out-
of-wedlock father would only remind the child of his unfortunate past, Com-
monwealth e rel. (sic) v. Spano, 68 Pa. D. & C. 248 (Munic. Ct. Phila. 1949),
or where the mother had subsequently married and she and her husband had
no intention of telling the child about his past, Commonwealth ex rel. Golem-
bewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
26. See note 19 npra.
27. Any discussion of adoption centers around the adoption statutes since
adoption was unknown at common law. See, e.g., Goslikarian v. County Tem-
porary Home, 110 Conn. 463, 148 Atl. 379 (1930); Ekendahl v. Svolos, 388 11.
412, 58 NE.Rd 585 (1944); Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957);
State ex re. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W.Va. 419, 108 SXE.2d 521 (1959).
28. E.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 27, § 3 (1958); AaIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-108 A
(1)(b) (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (c) (1947); CAL. CIv. CODE § 224;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304 (b)(2)(C) (Supp. V. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
11-10 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.82.030 (2) (1951).
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proceedings. 29 Most child welfare statutes, however, simply fail to
mention the father ° It is difficult to determine whether this
omission reflects a failure to evaluate society's attitude toward
the out-of-wedlock father, or a determination that the father
should not be heard. Whatever the reason, it seems appropriate to
reexamine the child custody provisions with a view to possible
modification if it can be shown that the out-of-wedlock father
should have some opportunity to be heard when the mother re-
linquishes custody of the child 1
MiNNESOTA ADoPTioN PRocEDuRms
In order to effectively discuss the problems involved in the
subject under discussion, it is necessary to focus upon the adop-
tion laws of a single state. In Minnesota, for example, the natural
mother may relinquish the child for adoption either by a hearing
to terminate all parental rights in the child,3 2 or by surrendering
the child to an authorized adoption agency 3
A. PARENTAL TERMINATION HEARiN G
The parental termination hearing can be considered a first
step toward adoption, although it actually precedes the adoption
process. The hearing may be initiated upon petition by any
reputable person, including the natural mother to decide whether
parental rights will be terminated.3 4 Notice of the hearing need be
given only to the mother or guardian of the illegitimate child3 5
29. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1963); IL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8
(1965); Miss. CoDE AN. § 1269-03 (Supp. 1964); N.J. REv. STAT. § 9: 3-18 (f)
(Supp. 1954); TFx. REv. Cir. STAT. ANN. art. 46a (6) (Supp. 1965).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-5 (1953); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 2(c) (1963).
31. Reexamination is relevant since, even though few cases have reached
the appellate level concerning a father's right to seek custody of his illegitimate
child (Amicus curiae Brief by Professor Robert J. Levy, Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota, p.8). In Minnesota, for example, there is a growing
number of illegitimate births each year: 1952-1518; 1960-2379; 1964-
3427. The projection is for an even greater increase: 1971 - 5783; 1975 - 7615.
MINNESOTA POPULATION, LABOR FORCE Am EmPLOyMNT TR=ss OF THE
1960's (Nov. 1964).
While it is not possible to predict how many fathers of these prospective
illegitimate births will acknowledge their children, based upon present indica-
tions a growing number of them probably will.
32. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.221-.245 (Supp. 1965).
33. Mun-. STAT. A_. §§ 259.21-.32 (Supp. 1965).
34. M NN. STAT. A". §§ 260.221, .Q31 (Supp. 1965).
35. Id. at § 260.135.
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The Minnesota provisions make it clear that notice to or consent
from the out-of-wedlock father is not required 6 After the hearing
the court may terminate all parental rights and place the child for
adoption.37
With the illegitimate child thus available for adoption, 8 the
out-of-wedlock father who may have a sincere interest in the
disposition of his child discovers that his parental rights have been
terminated by the court even though he had no notice of the pro-
ceedings. The statutes setting forth the procedures for the sub-
sequent adoption also disregard the father since his consent is
not required3 Moreover, the adoption statute provides that a
person whose consent is not required is not entitled to notice of
the adoption hearing 40 The father, by his own motion, might
later appear at the adoption hearing41 which must take place
several months after the child has been placed in the adoptive
home. He would have little chance of uprooting the child from
the adopting parents, however, since courts hesitate to disrupt a
family unit once established. -
The Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted with a father's
request to be heard in In re Zink .43 The case involved a parental
termination hearing to terminate the rights of the mother. The
court held that although the adoption laws and parental termina-
tion statutes do not require the father's consent or notice to the
father, he does have the right to be made a party to the proceed-
ings when he takes the initiative.44 The court ruled that at the
36. Id. at §§ 260.135(2), 259.24-26.
37. Id. at § 260.241.
38. A termination hearing may sever all parental rights in the child. The
court then usually orders the child to be placed with a state or private agency
for adoption. This two step process is used since most authorities feel that
parental rights, litigation, and adoption proceedings should be kept separate.
See Note, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1954). For a comment on the aspects of
parental rights and their termination see 32 N.Y.UJ,. REv. 579 (1957).
39. Alum. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (Supp. 1965). After parental rights have
been terminated, the only consent required is that of the agency with whom
the child was placed by the court. Id. at §§ 259.24(c), (f) (Supp. 1965), .25
(1961).
40. M-iNN. STAT. ANx. § 259.26 (Supp. 1965).
41. The hearing must take place several months after the child has been
placed in the adoptive home. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 259.27 (Supp. 1965).
42. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
43. 269 Ainn. 5 5, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964). There are two Zink cases. The
first, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 731 (1963), involved a procedural issue which
the putative father had appealed. The second noted above, was a decision on
the merits in which the father unsuccessfully attempted to gain custody of his
illegitimate child.
44. The court made reference to MmN. STAT. AN. § 260.155(6) (Supp.
10771966]
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hearing the father may give evidence, cross-examine witnesses,
and present his plan for the future of the illegitimate child. Zink
assures the out-of-wedlock father an opportunity to be heard only
when he is aware of the hearing and voluntarily comes forward.45
Notwithstanding this crucial limitation, the decision is significant.
The father is no longer limited to the untimely habeas corpus
proceedings; the alternative remedy created in Zink is the result
of a liberal interpretation of statutes which appear on their face
to have a total disregard for his interests.
B. VOLUNTARY SURREDER PROCESS
The voluntary surrender process may also be the first step
in the illegitimate child's ultimate adoption by new parents. Un-
like the parental termination hearing, however, the voluntary sur-
render procedures are included as part of the adoption statutes
themselves." Under these provisions the natural mother may
agree in writing that the illegitimate child will be placed for adop-
tion.4 7 It is important to realize that under the voluntary sur-
render procedures a judicial hearing is not required until the
new adopting parents petition the court for an adoption decree.
In Minnesota that petition may not be granted until the child has
lived at least six months in the home of the adopting parents.4 8
The out-of-wedlock father will probably encounter more ob-
stacles in coming forward in the actual adoption hearing than he
would have had in an earlier parental termination hearing. The
father's first disadvantage is his lack of knowledge of the adoption
hearing. It is clear that the out-of-wedlock father is not entitled
to notice;49 not even the natural mother is entitled to notice after
she has consented to the adoption.50 The statutes specify that all
1965). This section was passed in 1959 and was the basis of the Minnesota
court's holding in In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W.2d 449 (1962), which
in turn the court relied upon in deciding Zink.
45. In re Zink, 269 Mlinn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964).
46. MnqN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24, (Supp. 1965), .25 (1961) are the basic vol-
untary surrender sections. They are a part of the adoption provisions, Id. at
§§ 25921-.32 (Supp. 1965).
47. The natural mother signs a standard consent form or contract with
the child placement agency after the agency has explained to the mother all
the ramifications of her consent. nMm. STAT. § 259.25(1) (1961).
48. Mm. STAT. ANN. § 259.27 (Supp. 1965).
49. Id. at §§ 259.24(1), .26(1) (Supp. 1965).
50. Id. at §§ 259.24(1)(f) (Supp. 1965), .25(1) (1961), .26 (Supp. 1965).
See also In re Adoption of Anderson, 235 Minn. 192, 50 N.W.2d 278 (1951).
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adoption hearings shall be held in closed court, generally without
admittance of any person not entitled to notice.51 Moreover the
significant time lapse makes it less likely that the court would
disturb the custody of the prospective adoptive parents.
A mother wishing to relinquish her child for adoption may
avoid the father's parental termination rights established in In re
Zink. She can merely avoid parental termination proceedings and
choose to relinquish the child quietly by voluntary surrender to an
adoption agency. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, held in
In re Brenna? 5 2 that the father would be permitted to bring a
timely habeas corpus action or other appropriate proceeding to as-
sert his interests. In Brennan the mother conceded that the father
would have been allowed to appear in a parental termination
hearing. But she argued that the adoption statutes providing for
her voluntary surrender provisions precluded hearing the father
unless the court so ordered in the best interests of the child. The
court rejected the mother's contention on the ground that making
the father wait to assert his interests until proceedings are institu-
ted implies that his rights in the child are without remedies.53 The
court emphasized that the statutory provisions for both parental
termination and adoption must be construed together in order to
reach a consistent result 4 The apparent conclusion is that an
out-of-wedlock father will be allowed to assert his interests in the
child as long as it is reasonably consistent with other interests
regardless of the method chosen by the mother to relinquish the
child.
II. UNDERLYING POLICIES AND INTERESTS
INVOLVED IN THE OUT-OF-WEDLOCK
FATHER'S OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
In light of Zink and Brennan, all interests which might be
affected by allowing a father to be heard should be examined.
51. 1 . STAT. § 259.31 (1961).
52. 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965). After the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the out-of-wedlock father had
a right to be heard, the lower court awarded custody of the child to the
father. Sadden v. Brennan, Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct. (Juv. Div.) Minn., June
23, 1965.
53. In re Brennan, supra note 52, at 463-64, 134 N.W.2d at 182.
54. It should be noted that the father in Brennan initiated his action after
the mother had relinquished the illegitimate child but before the child had
been placed with adoptive parents. See notes 6 and 42 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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These interests are of (1) the illegitimate child, (2) the natural
mother, (3) the adoption agencies and adopting parents, and (4)
the out-of-wedlock father. This inquiry should be directed at the
possibility of conflicts between competing interests, whether such
conflicts may be reconciled, and which interests should prevail if
the conflicts cannot be reconciled.
A. Tum CHmD
The principle controlling any proceeding involving a child is
that a court will be guided by the best interests of the child. 5 Re-
locating a child is unnatural and could adversely affect the child
in uncounted ways. Certainly, the best interests of the child de-
mand that the danger of emotional trauma be minimized." Chil-
dren, regardless of age, tend to identify quickly with -those caring
for them; once -available for adoption they should be placed as
quickly as possible.57 A young child who remains in a foster home
or in other temporary care for an extended length of time may
suffer trauma when he is ultimately transferred to permanent
surroundings. Closely related to the need for rapid placement is
the consideration that a child should be subjected to a minimum
number of changes in 'his physical custody s Adoption agencies
make every effort to place infants directly from the hospital to a
previously selected adoptive home.59 For the good of the child,
a father asserting his interest should be compelled to do so in a
manner which will not cause undue delay in placement or unneces-
sary relocation.
Another important factor is the possibility that a child may
derive substantial benefits from living with even one of his natural
parents.P° If the natural father is not given an opportunity to
present his plan, the child will be deprived of whatever advan-
tages he might have received from a natural parent.
Finally, the child has an interest in being placed in the proper
type of home. Most experts agree that a two parent home is
55. See notes 2-4 and 21 supra.
56. Doss, Is' You ADOPT A CHWD 147 (1957).
57. In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 781 (1968).
58. In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965). Kestenberg,
Separation from Parents, 8 NERVOUS CHILD 20 (1943); Clothier, Some
Afspects of the Problem of Adoption, 9 AmmICAsa J. or ORTHO-PSYCHIATRY
598, 608 (1939); Comment, 59 YALE L.. 715, 731 (1950).
59. Child placement agencies interviewed in the Twin Cities are in accord
with this statement.
60. See note 25 supra.
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preferable. The natural mother might refuse to release her child
for adoption if she thought the father could gain custody6 and
frustrate her desire to have the child adopted into a two parent
home8 2 However, the number of mothers who would refuse to
relinquish custody on this ground is probably minimal 3 More-
over, if it were clearly in the best interests of the child -to be placed
for adoption, parental termination procedures could be instituted
to terminate the mother's interests. The child's interest in proper
placement will be protected by the court in the adoptionproceed-
ings, even in those cases where an unmarried father is seeking
custody! 4
B. THE NATURAL MOTHER
The natural mother has primary responsibility for the care of
the child, and thus her interests are recognized to be superior
to those of anyone else6 5 Since the mother probably has the
greatest natural love for the child,66 it is felt that -the interests of
the child will probably be best served by maternal care.67 When,
however, the natural mother relinquishes the child for adoption,
she waives her parental rights. Nevertheless, the mother might
retain a strong interest in preventing the father from being heard.
Her interest, however, derives from the desire that the father
not be granted custody himself or that any other plan of his not
be accepted. This interest of the natural mother can be adequately
protected by hearing her objections without denying the father
the opportunity to present his plan. The courts will undoubtedly
be aware that the mother's objection to the father's assumption of
responsibility may be based on emotional factors other than the
best interests of the child.
61. In -re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 458, 134 N.W.2d 126, 129 (1965).
62. See Lavell v. Adoption Institute, 185 Cal. App. 2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr.
867 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); CHIm Wnuxnn LEAGUE OF A wERICA, STANDARDS
FoR ADOPION SERVIcE 35 (1958).
63. Katz, Judicial and Statutory Trends in the Law of Adoption, 51 GEo.
L. J. 64 (1962). Child placement agencies interviewed in the Twin Cities are
in accord with this statement.
64. Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala. 86, 18 So. 2d 730 (1944); Gardner v. Hall,
132 NJ.Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799 (Ch. 1942); see note 23 pupra.
65. See note 1 supra.
66. Lipsey v. Battle, 80 Ark. 287, 97 S.W. 49 (1906); Wall v. Hardee, 240
N.C. 465, 82 SE.2d 370 (1954).
67. E.g., Albee Appeal, 189 Pa. Super. 370, 150 A.2d 563 (1959); Common-
wealth ex rel. Kevitch v. McCue, 165 Pa. Super. 49, 67 A.2d 582 (1949).
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C. ADOPTION AGENcIES AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS
Any opportunities given to a father to assert his interests will
affect to some degree the operation of the adoption agenciesP8 and
the interests of adopting parents. Agencies seek to coordinate the
interests of all parties into an efficient adoption process0 9 Agencies
are primarily concerned with avoiding unnecessary delay in plac-
ing a child for adoption.70 Agencies are likewise hopeful that
placement with an adoptive family will result promptly in final
adoption by that family. One reason for these concerns is that
while the child is in the agency's custody, the child's interests
can be asserted and protected only through the agency. Conse-
quently, an agency has the same interest in rapid and certain
placement as does the child.71 The agency is also under some
moral obligation to the adoptive parents to insure that the child
will not later be taken from them without good cause. Moreover,
it is important that the agency operate as efficiently as possible
on limited funds and avoid wasted efforts.72 Admittedly, some
delay is built into the adoptive process to insure proper placement,
but such delay is predictable and expected.7" The agencies fear
unpredictable delay and interference such as experienced in In re
Larson74 where the court permitted the mother of an illegitimate
child to reclaim the child after she had been in an adoptive home
for seventeen months. Agencies -also desire to eliminate the uncer-
tainties created by the results in Zink and Brennan which might
allow the out-of-wedlock father to disrupt the adoption process
and interfere with otherwise successful placement. It is unlikely,
however, that agencies would object to clearly defined provisions
which would assure a timely appearance by the father. Moreover,
if agencies knew which fathers were actually interested, these
68. See In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 462-63, 184 N.Wd 126, 181-32
(1965). See generally Comment, 59 YAim L. J. 715 (1950), for a description
of authorized adoption agency practices.
69. Bucx, CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION 125-26 (1964).
70. The views and positions of the child placement agencies set forth in
this Note are based on personal interviews with Mr. James K. Merrill, Divi-
sion Director of the Child Welfare Division, Lutheran Social Service of Minne-
sota and Mr. Charles B. Olds, Executive Director, Children's Home Society of
Minnesota (November, 1965). The writer of this Note wishes to express his
gratitude for their time and assistance.
71. See notes 56-58 supra and accompanying text.
72. If there is a delay in placement and an agency has custody, the agency
will have to pay for the care of the child until he is placed.
73. See note 41 8upra.
74. 252 Minn. 490, 91 N.W.2d 448 (1958).
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fathers could be counseled in a manner similar to the advice
presently given natural mothers.75
The interest of the adoptive parents increases with the extent
of placement preparations and the amount of time the child lives
with them. It would be difficult to determine whether the child
or the adopting parents suffer the greatest emotional shock if the
child is unexpectedly reclaimedV 6 The adoptive parents are told
that there must be a minimum six month trial period of custody
and that actual adoption must await the final decree. It is doubt-
ful, however, that fear of losing the child during the trial period
has made prospective adopting parents unwilling to accept a
child from an agency.77 Nevertheless there is merit in making
every effort to avoid unnecessary disappointment or delay caused
by the untimely appearance of an out-of-wedlock father seeking
to assert his interests in his already placed illegitimate child.
D. THE OUT-OF-WEDLOCK FATHER
The prime interest of the father may be described as a psycho-
logical and financial equity in the child which develops as soon
as the father is known .7 One court has said that "certainly to an
illegitimate child, the father is never putative. '79 Likewise, to an
interested father, no child is ever illegitimate. Although the act
may be censured and the relationship disregarded, the fact re-
mains that there may be a natural bond between the father and
child. 0 Any bond of natural devotion and sense of responsibility
which exists should not be carelessly disregarded without some
opportunity for its expression.8' Furthermore, the law has imposed
on the father the obligation to support the child and mother"' as
well as inheritance responsibilities toward the child.88 These obli-
75. See Katz, supra note 63, at 66-67.
76. Doss, IF You ADOPT A Cnnn 147 (1957).
77. Of. Comment 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 564 (1961); Note, 61 YALEz L. J. 591
(1952).
78. In re Zink, 264 Minn. 500, 119 N.W.2d 731, (1963). AMN'. STAT. §§
257.18-.33 (1961), provide that a written acknowledgment renders -the father
of an illegitimate child liable for confinement expenses of the mother and
support of the child.
79. Commonwealth v. Ilozansld, 213 A.2d 155, 157 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1965).
80. People ex 7el. Meredith v. Meredith, 272 App. Div. 79, 82, 69 N.Y.S.2d
462, 466, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 692, 77 N.E.2d 8 (1947); Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc.
Rd 202, 165 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1957); see note 22 pra.
81. See In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 463, 131 N.W.2d 126, 132 (1965).
82. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 15 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
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gations should somehow be balanced with privileges, such as
allowing the father to be heard when the future of his child is
being determined.
The plan of the out-of-wedlock father might also provide in-
sights and suggest solutions otherwise unavailable or overlooked.
The prevailing standard in a custody hearing is that the disposi-
tion must be in the "best interests of the child." It seems proper
for the state to consider all reasonable alternatives and to be
eager to hear from all persons interested in the particular child. If
the father is allowed to come forward, he might be able to provide
the child (and himself) with those benefits of association between
natural parent and child which have been said to justify the
father's visitation and custody privileges subsequent to the
mother's death. After the mother relinquishes the child, the
only person who can provide a natural parent's love and affection
is the father.14
IV. PROPOSALS
It appears that the interests of the child, the natural mother,
and the agencies and adoptive parents should not -totally elimi-
nate the father. Any privilege granted to him for a hearing need
not unduly interfere with the existing rights of others in the
adoption process. However, a statute giving the father an oppor-
tunity to be heard should be clearly defined and incorporated into
the current adoption process8 5
An out-of-wedlock father's consent for adoption or his presence
at legal proceedings should never be required. It should be made
clear by statute that a father who does not come forward, or
does not initiate appropriate action within a short time after the
mother's relinquishment of the child for placement in an adoptive
home should thereafter be denied all opportunity to be heard.
Such a provision would terminate the rights of a father who did
not know of the mother's pregnancy or of the birth of the child"
84. In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888, (1954);
cf. Lipsey v. Battle, 80 Ark. 287, 97 S.W. 49 (1906); Wall v. Hardee, 240 N.C.
465, 82 S.E.2d 870 (1954). Both courts referred to a mother's love and affec-
tion as being greater than that of anyone else. Arguably, the mother's departure
would leave only the natural father to take her place.
85. In 1959 England provided the father the opportunity to be heard.
LEGrrnAcY ACT, 1959, 7 & 8 ELiz. 2, c. 73, s 3. For an analysis of the act,
see Note, 25 MoD. L. REv. 786 (1962).
86. In the opinion of the child placement agencies interviewed in the
Twin Cities, the situation where the out-of-wedlock father was unknown and
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as well as those of the father who failed to act promptly. But it
seems that the overall interests of the child, the adoption agencies
and adoptive parents would be unfairly prejudiced if fathers were
allowed to assert rights in an untimely manner.
A father should be given a statutory right to come forward
promptly at either a parental termination hearing, as decided in
In re Zink, or upon a direct surrender of the child by the natural
mother, as decided in In re Brennan. If the child is relinquished
through a parental termination hearing, the statute should pro-
vide that the father has the right to participate in that hearing if
he makes an appearance.Y7 If the child is surrendered directly to
an adoption agency, however, -there is no judicial hearing at
which the father could appear.8 To bring conformity to the two
methods, it is suggested that the father be given the statutory
right to initiate a parental termination hearing in which he may
assert his interests. The father should be required to initiate this
action within a relatively short time after becoming aware of the
child's surrender to eliminate any substantial delay in placing the
child in an adoptive home.89 If, as frequently happens, the mother
surrenders her rights in the child before the child is born, the
father should be allowed to initiate judicial proceedings immedi-
ately. Requiring the father to wait until the child's birth may
complicate attempts to place the child directly from the hospital.
Such statutory machinery would serve the interests of all con-
cerned by eliminating the present uncertainty as to when and
how the father must come forward.90
The foregoing discussion has focused on statutory provisions
which would allow the father to come forward on his own initia-
tive when he discovers that either a parental termination or
would then come forward to be heard would rarely arise. But see note 31 supra
and accompanying text.
87. One jurisdiction requires that a child cannot be adopted until the
parental rights in that child are terminated by court order. MicH. Coimr.
LAws § 710.10- (1948).
88. Miny. STAT. § 259.25 (1961), .24(f) nUN. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1965).
89. A good example of the delay which can be caused while rights are
being litigated is presented by the two Zink cases where the custody of the
child was not determined for two years. See note 43 supra; In re Sinaner's
Petition, 16 Ill. App. 2d 48, 147 N.E.2d 419 (1957); In re Adoption of Mor-
rison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W.2d 759 (1951).
90. The father would be required to act quickly to minimize adverse effects
on the child caused by delay and uncertainty. Kestenberg, Separation from
Parents, 3 NERvous CHm) 20 (1943); Clothier, Some Aspects of the Problem
of Adoption, 9 AmERicAN J. oF ORTHo-PsycHIATRY 598, 608 (1939).
1966] 1085
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1071
voluntary surrender is in progress. The problem of whether a
known father should have a right to notice remains. Admittedly,
any proposal requiring notice goes far beyond the provisions of
most existing statutes." The suggestion can be made that notice
of the proceedings should not be given to -any out-of-wedlock
fathers. Then only those fathers who were sufficiently interested
to keep themselves aware of the status of their children would
make timely appearances. Of course, a denial of all notice would
have the advantage of preventing most disinterested fathers from
appearing. But a failure to give notice may unnecessarily exclude
fathers who desire to be heard.
When the natural mother never intends to retain custody of her
illegitimate child, the father, if interested and aware of the preg-
nancy, could come forward before or at the time of birth to ap-
pear at, or initiate, a parental termination hearing. Difficulties
arise in situations where the mother's intentions are either not
revealed or where a previous decision to keep the child is changed
at some later date. In either of these circumstances there may be
substantial reasons for the father not to challenge the mother's
right to custody. He may actually prefer that the child be raised
by the mother; or he may realize that he would have little chance
of overcoming the mother's superior interest in the child.92 Never-
theless, in either situation, the father could retain a strong desire
to present his own plan should the mother relinquish custody at
some later date. Although some interested fathers might be able
to maintain constant surveillance over the mother's activities, it
might be physically impossible or totally impractical for others.
A mother who wished to deprive the father of all opportunity to
be heard could surrender her child quietly to an adoption agency
at a time when the interested father would be unaware of her
actions. However, the father could be allowed to announce offi-
cially his interest by filing a notice of his intentions. Such a system
will allow notification to the father of any pending disposition of
the child. This will also relieve the father of the unnecessary and
unfair burden to remain constantly aware of the child's status and
the mother's intentions. Moreover, adoption agencies would then
be put on notice that the father has an interest in the disposition
of his child. The appearance of unknown fathers who unexpected-
91. North Dakota requires notice to be sent to the duly acknowledged
out-of-wedlock father without requiring his consent. N.). CNT. CODE § 14-
11-10 (1960).
92. See note 1 supra.
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ly assert their interests would be eliminated9 Failure to file notice
of intention or to make a timely appearance would be deemed
a waiver of all paternal rights.
It is proposed that an out-of-wedlock father who desires notice
should be required to have first registered with the Commissioner
of Child Welfare within some reasonable period, prior to either
a parental termination hearing or a voluntary surrender by the
mother.94 After the initial notification to the Commissioner, the
father would be required to reaffirm his continuing interest an-
nually. This proposal incorporates the belief that it would not
be wise to give blanket notice -to all fathers who might have regis-
tered at any previous time. It is possible that a father who gave
notice of his sincere interest when the child was born may have
lost it before the mother released the child, and therefore should
not be entitled to notice. Conversely, it is equally possible that a
father may not have been anxious to be heard when his child was
born, but does wish to be heard by the time the child is re-
linquished. It would be both unfair and unreasonable to deny
notice to a father thus awakened to his responsibility. Finally, if
the mother surrenders her rights before or at the time of the
child's birth, the father's prior registration would entitle him to
notice and enable him to initiate proceedings at either of those
early stages. Thus, the proposed solution has the advantage of
giving notice only to fathers who are interested at or very near
the time when the child's custody is being determined.
CONCLUSION
The number of out-of-wedlock fathers who are interested in
their children is perhaps so small that it might appear an extrava-
gant waste of time, energy, and money to direct attention to the
rights and interests of so few. To those few, however, the problem
is of great importance. When sincere concern for the welfare of
their illegitimate children is shown, out-of-wedlock fathers deserve
the attention of society so that their interests can be expressed
freely and fairly.
9. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
94. Notice to the Commissioner of Child Welfare followed by notice by
the Commissioner to the out-of-wedlock father can be accomplished by
amending existing statutory provisions without establishing an additional
agency for this purpose. See Afmr. STAT. §§ 257.175, .82, .8 (1961).
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